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The greatest challenge to democracy in Nigeria is the historic and continuing economic and political disenfranchisement of ethnic minorities. With an estimated population of 110 million, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. ... With such a large number of affiliations, it is no wonder that Nigeria has struggled to attain viability as a federation that represents all of its constituents. ... This dynamic translates into the political disenfranchisement of a significant portion of Nigeria’s population, as the sum of minorities in all of the regions accounts for one third of the population.
This same sector of Nigeria’s population suffers the harmful effects of the oil industry on their lands and livelihoods. The multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria have shown the same disregard for the concerns of the ethnic minorities that the federal government has. ... The collusion of the oil companies and the Nigerian government to deprive the country’s ethnic minorities of a meaningful role in civil society is the greatest threat to democracy facing Nigeria. ... Bayelsa state alone provides 40% of Nigeria’s oil, yet it is among Nigeria’s poorest states. ... ” To understand how these conditions have come about and continue to persist over the years, it is necessary to investigate the long history of governmental neglect of the oil-producing regions through petroleum revenue allocations and representation schemes, as well as the direct effects that oil exploration and extraction has had on the communities.
It is impossible to analyze the causes and affects of regional and ethnic divisions in Nigeria without contemporaneously investigating the allocation of petroleum revenues to different states. A desire for greater sums of profit from the oil industry has been an impetus for statehood seeking for as long as the industry has contributed to Nigeria’s economy. The issue of revenue allocation is complicated by the fact that the oil producing region consists of only nine out of Nigeria’s 36 states, yet provides over 90% of Nigeria’s export earnings and almost all of its tax revenue. ...
In 1939 the British colonial government divided Nigeria into three regions, with a dominant ethnic group in each area. ...
When Nigeria became a federation in 1954, it maintained its regional divisions. ...
Before 1959, the oil producing areas retained all of the petroleum revenues that it generated, but the new federal government cut the retained revenue by half. When Nigeria gained its independence in 1960, it kept the tripartite structure. In each region, the political party of the ethnic majority dominated, so that governmental power in Nigeria became a three-way contest, with the minority groups left out of the system completely. Minority groups remained convinced that constituting their own states would improve their political and economic status in Nigeria. ... Biafran forces eventually occupied the Midwest, which produced one third of Nigeria’s crude oil at the time, before they were defeated in January 1970. ...
After the war, Nigeria experienced a period of rapid growth in petroleum output, so that by 1973 the country was producing more than two million barrels per day, and by the mid 1970’s petroleum accounted for one third of the country’s gross domestic product. During this oil boom the claims of oil producing areas to petroleum revenues decreased while political and economic power was centralized in the federal government. ...
During this period Nigeria experienced unprecedented corruption in the way that these revenues were transferred. ... The document asserted that the Ogoni people wished to remain part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but demanded political autonomy that included the following:
“ . ... ”
Due largely to the decrease in oil production caused by minority group protests, Babangida raised the percentage of petroleum revenue allocated to oil producing communities in 1992 from 1. ... That same year, Babangida created the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) “to address the difficulties and sufferings of inhabitants of the Oil Producing Areas of Nigeria. ... Department of State 1999 Human Rights Report for Nigeria noted that OMPADEC, “ . ...
In June of 1993 the transition to democracy came to a halt when President Babangida annulled the results of the June 12 presidential election. ...
Abacha’s attitude towards state creation and petroleum revenue allocation was unsympathetic to ethnic minorities who were still requesting autonomous states within the federation and larger percentages of the revenue from oil export. In March 1995 Abacha inaugurated the board of a new Petroleum Special Trust Fund (PSTF) to use revenue from increasing oil prices to “identify key projects in all parts of the federation so as to bring about equitable development to all our communities. ... Out of this summit came a communiqué calling for the abolition of the PSTF and the replacing of OMPADEC with legislation that grants oil-producing communities control of their petroleum resources and environmental protection. ... The increased oil revenue that the Ijaws would receive was offset by the creation of the five other new states, which were spread equally throughout different regions of Nigeria. ...
Aside from official policy, Abacha did much to degrade the economy of oil-producing regions through his unofficial policy of patronage to his supporters, who did not consist of ethnic minorities:
The “presidential allocation” was said to amount to up to 200,000 bpd, one tenth of Nigeria’s production, under General Abacha, and to have been distributed for political support, including to politicians participating in Abacha’s transition program. ...
Abacha also used Nigeria’s oil resources to buy favor with other countries. In 1997 he awarded six crude term contracts to member states of the Economic Community of West African States, allowing them to sell the oil or use it, bringing to nine the number of neighboring governments benefiting from Nigeria’s oil wealth while the Ogoni and the Urhobo went without pipe-born water, electricity, and government development projects. ...
The resistance of the federal government to give oil-producing communities a larger share of petroleum revenues than non-producing communities places the producing communities at a disadvantage because of the havoc that oil productions wreaks on their environment, and subsequently on their economies. Shell British Petroleum was the first oil company to extract petroleum from Nigeria, after the company discovered Nigeria’s first commercial oil field in 1956. Ever since, the minority regions of Southern Nigeria have been paying the price for the country’s oil industry.
One of the ways that the oil producing communities pay for Nigeria’s oil wealth is with the loss of lands for the use of their inhabitants. The Land Use Act of 1978, still in effect in Nigeria today, enables the governor of each state to grant land to whom ever or what ever company he sees fit, provided that such a transfer is, “for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians. ... According to Nigeria’s Environmental Minister, Hassan Adamu, the Niger Delta’s most serious environmental challenges are the results of oil production. ... Oil companies in Nigeria flare 75% of the natural gas they extract because even with the minimal fees per barrel, flaring is less expensive than the alternatives. ...
Although Shell admits that most of their pipes in Nigeria are substandard, they claimed in 1996 that 60% of oil leaks were the result of sabotage. ... In their report on the effects of multinationals in Nigeria, Essential Action, an environmental and human rights advocacy group, explained the situation of Nigerians accused of sabotage:
Communities have little recourse under the Nigerian political system.
Approximate Word count = 6053
Approximate Pages = 24.2
(250 words per page double spaced)
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